Thursday, 20 May 2010 11:48

 EU - Russia: it is not the question of reset

Opinion

Paweł Świeboda

Another EU – Russia summit is approaching in what is seen atmospherically as the best context for years. For a few months now, Russia has projected a different image in its foreign policy and began acting as a responsible international actor, at least in some areas. President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin are on a charm offensive around and beyond Europe, courting less the Venezuelan and Cuban leaders and rubbing shoulders more with the Poles, the Norwegians or the Turks

  However, judgement of Russian policy has to be made on the basis of more than the atmospherics, regardless of how big a relief a more forthcoming Russia provides. There are four crucial tests for progress in the EU’s relations with Russia. They have to do with cooperation on global issues, democracy & rule of law, neighbourhood and energy.

When it comes to the global dimension, Russia is clearly more cooperative and engaged on the Iranian question, providing useful insights and keeping open the option of supporting tougher UN sanctions. The new START treaty proved that Russia is prepared to go along with the US where it can also shine in the limelight on the basis of the remnants of its great power status. President Medvedev was a quiet participant of the Copenhagen climate negotiations but he watched carefully how Chinese leaders posititioned themselves and drew his lessons. However, the jury is still out as to whether Russia will be ready to engage on a permanent basis. Moscow has previously been greatly concerned about its international status and less interested in an active role in Middle Eastern Quartets or alikes where it normally just sat passively, happy to be a member.

On democracy and rule of law, progress is muted. Cases of civil rights activists or campaigners for police reform such as Vadim Karastelev, who have been severely beaten or taken to psychiatric institutes, are still abundant. The Kremlin seems unwilling to address the mega-thorny issues like the role of President Kadyrov in Chechnya. The corporate governance picture is somewhat more promising but even the resolution of the flagship battle between Telenor and Alpha Group does not mean that the opaque legal system, which lacks in transparency, has been radically improved. The empathy that the Russian authorities showed towards Poland after the tragic air crash in April and the earlier willingness of Prime Minister Putin to start setting the historical record straight is encouraging. The big question remains if the historical debate can be imported into Russia itself or will it be the reserved territory of Russia’s foreign policy.

When it comes to the neighbourhood, there are largely set-backs. Although there has been no Russian fiddling in the Ukrainian presidential elections, Moscow launched a fundamental challenge to the EU policy towards the region. The Russian – Ukrainian Black Sea naval base agreement and the extent of intervention which Russia envisages in the Ukrainian economy, from pipelines to aircraft industry, can easily set Ukraine back several years in its modernisation process for the promise of easy cash which the country finds wanting. The Beijing consensus seems to have been studied carefully in Moscow as has China’s investment spree in Africa and Latin America. Why should not Russia do a little bit of the same closer home? The challenge which this presents to the EU policy is that the EU pursues a long-term strategy of systemic change, consolidation of the market and democracy while Russia throws in short-term cash hand-outs hoping for an immediate gain. What is worst, the deals with Russia are highly detrimental to the Ukrainian democracy as attempts to build consensus around strategic issues are thrown aside.

When it comes to energy, the changes are probably most significant. Russia has lost the Chinese market for some years after the opening of the pipeline from Turkemenistan to China at the end of 2009. Gazprom forced TNK-BP to close the Kovykta field in Eastern Siberia which would have supplied the Chinese market and it can therefore for the moment only export LNG gas from Sakhalin to China. What is more, Russia feels the pressure of the lower European demand and lower world gas prices following the US shale gas bonanza. If that bonanza spreads to Central Europe, which we will know more about in the next two years, Gazprom will be pressed really hard. All this means that the economics of projects like the Northern Pipeline or South Stream looks entirely different. Shale gas may do more to build an EU external energy policy towards Russia than dozens of meetings and declarations in the past... 

Relations with Russia are often described as the most important foreign policy preoccupation for the European Union. The question is, however, how do we judge the success? Everybody has a different answer. The point remains that only when we register progress in all four crucial areas – from global issues to democracy, neighbourhood and energy - will we be able to start speaking of a success story. The talk of the reset might be creating a good atmosphere but it should not be seen as the crowning achievement which it is not.

The EU should rethink its old habit of having summits with everybody on a regular basis irresptive of whether there is good reason for it or not. They serve the useful purpose of ticking off relations with the different world powers and continents but little else. Summits should only take place when there is substance to be agreed. There is plenty to settle on with Russia but it requires Russian willingness to move on issues like WTO membership or transparency in energy relations. We should have no illusions about modernisation until these key stumbling blocks are resolved. Fundamentally, success will only be achieved when the Russian authorities will no longer build their legitimacy in opposition to the West. We are not quite there yet.